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Sanders v. Sears-Page, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 50 (July 16, 2015)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE: JUROR BIAS
Summary
The Court held that the district court erred in deciding not to strike an empaneled juror
whose background implied bias, but who promised he could remain impartial. Moreover, the
Court held the district court erred in allowing challenges for cause while the juror was present,
and by allowing newly discovered evidence to be entered into evidence on the final day of trial.
Background
This case arose from a personal injury claim following a 2009 car accident. Risa SearsPage hit Toni Sanders’ car when Sears-Page attempted to make a right turn from the left-hand
lane. Following the crash, Sanders began experiencing worsening neck pain. Sanders, along
with her husband Robert Sanders, sued Sears-Page for negligence.
Sanders’ injuries
The primary issue at trial was whether the accident caused Sanders’ injuries and if so,
whether Sanders’ medical expenses were reasonable. Prior to the 2009 accident, Sanders had
experienced back and neck pain. Sanders doctors, however, claimed the 2009 accident was the
cause of Sanders’ neck pain, and claimed her medical treatment and expenses were reasonable
and necessary. In further support of her claim, Sanders provided records and billing from
Nevada Spine Clinic.
The Defendant and her experts argued that Sanders’ injuries had not occurred as a result
of the 2009 accident, but rather were pre-existing. The Defense claimed the doctors at Nevada
Spine Clinic had pushed Sanders into having an unnecessary spine surgery in order to run up her
medical expenses.
Juror 9
After trial began, Juror 9 notified the district court that he had previously been a patient at
Nevada Spine Clinic. During voir dire, neither party had mentioned Nevada Spine Clinic or Dr.
Ghuman, Juror 9’s treating physician. The district court and counsel questioned juror 9. Juror 9
explained that he had been to Nevada Spine Clinic because of a herniated disc. There, Juror 9
was advised that back surgery would be a necessity. Juror 9 opted for a second opinion, and was
told by the second physician that surgery was unnecessary.
Juror 9 explained to the district court and counsel that he could remain impartial and
would fairly evaluate the Nevada Spine Clinic’s doctor’s opinions.
While Juror 9 was present, the district court asked counsel if either side wished to
challenge Juror 9 for cause. Sanders’ counsel challenged Juror 9 for cause. Sears-Page’s
counsel agreed there was good reason to strike Juror 9; however, the district court denied
Sanders’ motion to strike, and allowed Juror 9 to remain on the jury.
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Exhibit 62
Prior to trial, both parties sought records from one of Sanders’ prior treating physicians,
Dr. Pollard; however, Dr. Pollard provided them with only partial records. During the trial, an
unidentified individual delivered a box of documents box of documents to Sears-Page’s counsel.
The box contained a portion of Dr. Pollard’s missing medical records from 2005. The records
said Sanders suffered from “spinal degenerative joint disease and upper cervical area with bone
spur.” This contradicted Sanders’ claims made at trial.
Sears-Page sought permission from the district court to enter the documents into
evidence. Sanders objected, but the district court admitted the document as exhibit 62. SearsPage’s medical expert, Dr. Duke, examined exhibit 62 on the stand, and concluded that it
supported his opinion, “that Sanders had a chronic, degenerative disease that predated the 2009
automobile accident and was the sole cause of her neck pain.
The jury found for Sears-Page. Sanders appeals.
Discussion
The Nevada supreme court considered 4 issues: “whether the district court erred in (1)
failing to strike Juror 9 for cause, (2) inviting challenges for cause while Juror 9 was present, (3)
admitting exhibit 62, and (4) allowing Dr. Duke to give undisclosed opinions based on exhibit
62.”
Sanders’ challenge to Juror 9 for cause
“The Nevada Constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, guarantees litigants the right to a
jury trial.”2 An important feature of jury trials is an impartial jury. If a juror’s statements imply
bias, the trial court must question the juror to determine whether the juror can be impartial. A
juror may be actually biased if the juror’s statements indicate a state of mind that would prevent
the juror the being impartial in deciding the case.3
If the trial court questions the juror, and determines the juror is truly impartial, the
Nevada Supreme Court will generally give wide deference to the trial court’s decision.
However, deference will not be extended where failure to strike the juror was erroneous. In a
situation like the one here, “if the juror’s statements, taken as a whole, indicate bias, the juror
must be struck.”
Other jurisdictions have held that where a juror’s experiences are so similar to the one
being tried, so as to make it improbable for the juror to be impartial, the juror must be stricken
from the jury.4 The Nevada Supreme Court agreed, holding, “that if a juror’s ‘background is
replete with circumstances which would all into question his ability to be fair,’ 5 the district court
should remove the juror for cause, even if the juror has stated he or she can be impartial.” In
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determining whether to strike the juror, the district court should base its decision on objective
facts regarding the juror’s experiences, rather relying on the juror’s promise to remain impartial.
Here, the Court held the district court abused its discretion in failing to strike Juror 9 for
cause. Juror 9’s experiences with Nevada Spine Clinic were similar to Sanders’. Sanders’ case
relied heavily on evidence provided by Nevada Spine Clinic. Juror 9’s experience with Nevada
Spine Clinic was likely to color Juror 9’s ability to objectively assess the evidence from Nevada
Spine Clinic. The district court denied Sanders’ challenge to Juror 9 based on Juror 9’s promise
to remain impartial. However, Juror 9’s statement claiming impartiality was not unequivocal,
thus further evidencing Juror 9’s inability to remain impartial. The district court’s error is
reversible because, “Juror 9’s presence on the jury resulted in an unfair empaneled jury.”
A party’s challenge for cause while an empaneled juror is present
The Nevada Supreme Court has previously held that a district court’s conduct may
prejudice jurors against a party. 6 Here, the trial judge asked both parties if they wished to
challenge Juror 9 for cause, while Juror 9 was still present in the courtroom. Once Sanders said
she wished to challenge Juror 9 for cause, the judge asked Juror 9 to exit the courtroom. The
Court held, “the district court’s process of requiring the parties to issue their challenges for cause
in front of Juror 9 amounted to plain error.” This error is reversible.
Exhibit 62
“A district court abuses its discretion by admitting medical expert testimony that fails to
comply with Nevada’s rules governing the admission of evidence.” The Court held that, “the
district court abused its discretion in admitting exhibit 62 because it was not properly
authenticated.” Furthermore, the Court held, “the district court further abused its discretion in
allowing Dr. Duke to testify to an undisclosed opinion regarding exhibit 62.”
Authentication
The Court held that exhibit 62 was improperly admitted because it was not authenticated.
NRS 52.015(1) provides that, “authentication of a document requires evidence or some other
showing ‘that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.’” Relevant to this case, a
document may be authenticated by a witness if the witness has personal knowledge of the
document. If the witness does not have personal knowledge of the document, then the witness’
testimony, alone, is not enough to authenticate the document.7
Here, Dr. Duke did not create the document, nor did he have personal knowledge of the
document. Therefore, Dr. Duke was not capable of authenticating the document through
testimony. “Because no other evidence corroborated exhibit 62, since Sanders testified she had
not sought medical care for neck pain in 2005, and the exhibit was not properly authenticated,
the district court abused its discretion in admitting exhibit 62.” This error was not harmless.

6

7

See Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408 (1970).
See Frias v. Valle, 101 Nev. 219 (1985).
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Undisclosed expert opinion
NRCP 16.1(a)(2) requires parties to disclose experts and the content of experts’
testimony in advance of trial. The Nevada Supreme Court has previously held that a trial court
erred when it allowed the plaintiff’s medical experts to offer opinions based on documents not
disclosed during discovery.8
Here, the district court allowed Sears-Page’s medical expert, Dr. Duke, testify as to
Sanders’ pre-existing neck pains while using exhibit 62 to support his opinion. The district court
erred in allowing Dr. Duke opine that exhibit 62 supported his stance that Sanders had been
experiencing neck pain prior to the subject accident. This was a violation of NRCP 16.1.
Harmless error
The district court’s errors regarding exhibit 62, “were not harmless in light of the record
as a whole.” Exhibit 62 presented a surprise to the Plaintiff, Sanders, and unfairly prejudiced her
case. As such, the district court’s error was reversible.
Conclusion
The Court held that the district court erred in failing to strike Juror 9 for cause, because
Juror 9’s statements regarding his experience at Nevada Spine Clinic evidence bias against
Sanders. The district court further erred in allowing Juror 9 to be present when Sanders
challenged Juror 9 for cause. The district court erred by admitting exhibit 62 into evidence
without it having been properly authenticated. Finally, the district court erred when it allowed
Dr. Duke to testify using exhibit 62. The Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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